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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
On this appeal, Defendant/Appellant Ironwood Exploration, 
Inc. ("Ironwood" herein) has raised the following issues: 
1. Do the mechanics1 lien statutes (§ 38-1-1, et seq., 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)) entitle Graco to recover 
from the lessee of an oil well location charges incurred incident 
to rental of equipment, sale of equipment not consumed on the 
project, transportation charges, or charges for repair of rented 
equipment? The court below improperly held that they do. 
2. Do the attorney's fees provisions of the mechanics1 
lien statutes (§ 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)) 
entitle Graco to an award of all attorney's fees incurred where 
it prevailed on only a portion of its claims and/or the fees were 
incurred in prosecution of matters other than lien foreclosure? 
Again, the court below improperly held that they do. 
On cross-appeal, Plaintiff/Respondent Graco Fishing and 
Rental Tools, Inc. ("Graco" herein) has raised the following 
additional issues: 
3. Does the contractors' bond statute, § 14-2-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, apply to rental services performed on an oil well? 
The court below properly held that it does not. 
4. Is Graco entitled to recover from Ironwood on a theory 
of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit when it had an express 
1 
contract with a third party to provide the rental equipment? The 
court below correctly held that it is not. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Graco is not entitled to a mechanics1 lien on Ironwood's oil 
well because the statute, as it existed at the time Graco rented 
its equipment to Ironwood's drilling contractor, did not 
contemplate such a lien for unpaid rentals. Graco similarly is 
not entitled to a lien for equipment sold because that equipment 
did not become a part of the premises, nor was it consumed in the 
process of developing the well. Also, GracoTs claim of lien for 
transportation charges made in connection with the equipment 
rentals and for expenses incurred to repair the rental equipment 
must fail because such charges are beyond the contemplation of 
the mechanics1 lien laws. 
The lower court erred in awarding attorney fees to Graco 
because it did not carry its burden of proving the fees claimed 
were incurred in the successful prosecution of its mechanics1 
lien claims, and not in the unsuccessful prosecution of its 
subcontractors' bond and unjust enrichment or implied contract 
claims. Graco is only entitled to an award of attorney fees on 
those claims on which it prevailed. 
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On cross-appeal, Graco asserts that the lower court erred in 
refusing to award it judgment on its contractors' bond claim. 
The court ruled correctly, however, because at the time Graco 
entered into its rental contract, the statute did not contemplate 
that such a bond would be required for equipment rentals. 
Finally, Graco also contends on its cross-appeal that it 
should have recovered on its unjust enrichment or implied 
contract claims. However, it had an express contract with a 
third party and a cause of action for implied contract will never 
lie where there is an express contract. 
ARGUMENT 
I. GRACO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A LIEN 
FOR THE SERVICES IT PROVIDED 
At the outset of its argument, Graco recites several general 
tenets of statutory construction, i.e., that statutes should be 
given a plain reading, ambiguities should be resolved to give 
primary effect to the intent of the Legislature, and the statute 
should be read as a whole and in light of the general purpose it 
was intended to serve and should be applied to accomplish that 
purpose. Brief of Respondents, pp. 5-6. Ironwood has no 
particular quarrel with those basic rules because their 
application to the mechanics' lien statute in question compels a 
finding that the statute does not apply to the services Graco 
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rendered. We again consider each category of service 
independently: 
1. Rental Charges. As discussed at length in its 
Appellants' Brief, it is Ironwood's position that the rental 
charges asserted by Graco are not lienable items and, therefore, 
will not support the lower court's judgment herein. Appellants' 
Brief, pp. 6-9. The basis of that contention is that the 1981 
Utah Legislature amended the mechanics' lien statute to include a 
lien for rentals, but only to the extent the rental was made in 
conjunction with the construction or improvement of a building; 
the amendment did not apply to rentals in connection with the 
development of oil and gas wc^lls. To demonstrate that fact, 
Ironwood quoted the statute, utilizing bracketed numbers to 
identify its four separate and distinct provisions: 
[1] Contractors, subcontractors and all 
persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in 
the construction, alteration, or improvement 
of any building or structure or improvement 
to any premises in any manner; [2] all 
persons who shall do work or furnish 
materials for the prospecting, development, 
preservation or working of any mining claim, 
mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; 
[3] and licensed architects and engineers and 
artisans who have furnished designs, plats, 
plans, maps, specifications, drawings, 
e s t i m a t e s of c o s t , s u r v e y s or 
superintendence, or who have rendered other 
like professional service, or bestowed labor, 
[4] shall have a lien upon the property upon 
or concerning which they have rendered 
service, performed labor or furnished or 
rented materials or equipment for the value 
of the service rendered, labor performed or 
materials or equipment furnished or rented by 
each respectively, . . . . 
Appellants' Brief, p. 7; Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated (as 
amended, 1981) (brackets and emphasis supplied). It is clear 
that only the provisions following bracketed numbers 1 and 4 were 
amended. 
Graco, on the other hand, asserts that the statute, so far 
as it applies to rentals in connection with development of oil 
wells, should be read as an independent section as follows: 
All persons who shall do work or furnish 
materials for the prospecting, development, 
preservation or working of any . . . oil and 
gas well . . . shall have a lien upon the 
property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor or 
furnished or rendered materials, or equipment 
for the value of the service rendered, labor 
performed or materials or equipment furnished 
or rented by each respectfully . . . . 
Brief of Respondents, p. 7. That suggestion, however, does not 
stand up to the very tenets of statutory construction posed by 
Graco. If Graco's suggestion were similarly applied to the first 
portion of the statute, it would read as follows: 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing or 
renting any materials or equipment used in 
the construction, alteration, or improvement 
of any building or structure or improvement 
to any premises in any manner . . . shall 
have a lien upon the property upon or 
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concerning which they have rendered service, 
performed labor or furnished or rented 
materials or equipment for the value of the 
service rendered, labor performed or 
materials or equipment furnished or rented by 
each respectively . ~. ~. 71 
(Emphasis added.) It will be observed that in rewriting the 
first portion of the statute in the manner suggested by Graco for 
the second, a duplication of the equipment rental provisions 
becomes apparent. Thus, in order to accept Graco's proposition, 
it must be concluded that the Legislature deemed it important to 
insert the words "or renting" and "or equipment" in the third 
line of the first portion of the statute, whereas it did not deem 
it necessary to do so at the similar location in the second 
portion of the statute. We prcssume that the Legislature intended 
the words "or renting" and "or equipment" to mean something in 
the first portion and the conspicuous absence thereof in the 
second portion suggests the Legislature intended something 
entirely different with respect to the second portion, i.e., that 
the cost of equipment rental is not a lienable item with respect 
to the development of oil and gas wells. 
This conclusion is well supported by a subsequent amendment 
of the mechanics' lien statutes. In 1987, the Utah Legislature 
again amended Section 38-1-3 to delete all of the second portion 
1
 The third portion of the statute, pertaining to licensed 
architects, engineers, etc. could be similarly rewritten. 
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thereof as set forth between [2] and [3] in our example, i.e., to 
remove all reference to mining claims, oil or gas wells, etc. As 
amended, Section 38-1-3 now contains only the first portion 
(following [1]) and the third and fourth portions (following [3] 
and [4] ). 
The Legislature then completely rewrote the lien provisions 
as they relate to oil, gas and mining in a new Chapter 10. 
Sections 38-10-101, et: seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended 1987); Addendum No. 1. The mining and oil and gas 
provisions formerly found in Section 38-1-3, as substantially 
modified and expanded, are now found in Section 38-10-102. A 
detailed reading of that amended statute discloses that 
references to equipment rentals as being lienable items are again 
conspicuously absent. The Legislature obviously gave a great 
deal of thought to the substantial 1987 amendments and it must be 
concluded that it did not intend that equipment rentals would 
support a lien, which is the same intent the Legislature had when 
it amended the statute in 1981 and refused to provide that rental 
of equipment would support a lien in connection with oil well 
development. 
2. Equipment Sales. In its opening Appellants' Brief, 
Ironwood contended that the $5,919.14 charged for the sale of 
drill pipe and gaskets will not support the alleged lien. 
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Appellants1 Brief, pp. 9-10. In response, Graco argues that the 
suggestion that the drill pipe and gaskets were removed upon 
completion of the project and, therefore, are not part of the 
improvements, is unsupported in the record. Brief of 
Respondents, p. 8. Conversely, the record also does not show 
that the pipe and gaskets were in fact "consumed" or became a 
part of the well in the drilling process as required by the 
Stanton court so as to support the imposition of a lien. Stanton 
Transportation Company v. Davis, 341 P.2d 207, 211, 9 Utah 2d 184 
(1959). Graco has lost track of who has the burden of proof. 
Graco has asserted that the equipment it has furnished will 
support a lien. Therefore, it has the burden of proof on that 
point. ][d. There being no evidence that the drill pipe and 
gaskets were consumed in the drilling process, ass Graco points 
out, it has failed to carry its burden. 
Graco also asserts that the drill pipe and gaskets are 
"equipment furnished" under a rental agreement and, therefore, 
are covered by the amended mechanics1 lien statute. Brief of 
Respondents, pp. 8-9. That is the same argument it makes with 
respect to rental equipment and Ironwood's response thereto will 
not be repeated here. The court is referred to the "rental 
charges" portion of this Brief, supra, pp. 4-7. 
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3, Transportation Charges. Ironwood contends that charges 
for the transportation of rental equipment also do not support a 
lien, both because they are not specifically provided for in the 
mechanics' lien statute and because the Stanton court expressly 
disallowed liens for transportation charges. Appellants' Brief, 
pp. 10-11. Graco disagrees on both counts. Brief of Respondents, 
pp. 9-10. 
The argument with respect to the applicability of the lien 
statute to rental contracts has been previously made and will not 
be restated here. As to its argument that transportation charges 
are covered, Graco misapprehends the effect of post-Stanton 
amendments to the mechanics' lien statute. A fundamental tenet 
of statutory construction which Graco overlooks is that the 
Legislature will be presumed to have adopted the judicial 
interpretation of statutes if it subsequently amends the statute 
without change to the judicially interpreted language. The 
principle was specifically stated in Christensen v. Industrial 
Commission, 642 P. 2d 755, 766 (Utah, 1982), which was cited by 
Graco: 
A w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d canon of s t a t u t o r y 
c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o v i d e s t h a t w h e r e a 
l e g i s l a t u r e amends a port ion of a s t a t u t e but 
leaves other port ions unamended, or re -enac ts 
them wi thou t change, t he l e g i s l a t u r e i s 
presumed to have been s a t i s f i e d with p r io r j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s of t he unchanged 
por t ions of the s t a t u t e and to have adopted 
them as cons is ten t with i t s own i n t e n t . 
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Id., 756 (citations omitted). Thus, looking at Stanton, we find 
this Court specifically holding: !l[T]hat the item . . . for the 
transportation of plaintiffs' drilling rig does not come within 
the intent and purpose of the statute and was not a valid lien 
against the defendant's property." 341 P.2d 211. 
Since this Court made that interpretation of the statute in 
1959, it has been amended not once, but twice. In 1981, as 
previously discussed, it was amended to add the provisions 
relating to the rental of equipment in connection with the 
construction of buildings but no change was made to allow 
transportation charges as lienable items. Therefore, the 
Legislature is presumed under the rule enunciated in Christensen, 
supra, to have accepted this Court's exclusion thereof as being 
consistent with the legislative intent. Thereafter, the 1987 
Legislature again amended the statute to delete references to oil 
and gas wells and mining from the original statute and enact a 
new statute covering those items as Section 38-10-101, et seq. 
This time, however, the Legislature specifically provided that 
the lien for oil and gas development work "shall be for the value 
of the work performed or materials or equipment furnished for: 
. . . (e) transportation and related mileage charges, for any 
work performed or materials or equipment furnished . . . •" 
Section 38-10-102(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended 
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1987); Addendum No. 1. Thus, in 1987 the Legislature 
acknowledged that there was no lien for transportation charges 
under former Section 38-1-3 and it then provided for such 
transportation charges in its 1987 amendment. However, the 1987 
statute is not applicable here since the work done by Graco was 
performed in 1983 and 1984, prior to the 1987 amendment and, 
therefore, the statute as it previously existed must be applied. 
4. Repair Charges. Graco contends that the $1,096.00 it 
charged for repair and inspection of its rental equipment is 
likewise covered by the mechanics' lien statute for the reasons 
previously discussed. Brief of Respondents, p. 10. Ironwood 
respectfully disagrees for the reasons stated in its opening 
Appellants' Brief (p. 11) and in its prior argument herein 
(supra, pp. 4-7). Ironwood will not restate those arguments 
here, other than to reiterate that since the statute does not 
apply to the rental of equipment used in developing oil wells, 
the repair and inspection of that equipment likewise cannot be 
covered. 
II. GRACO IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES ON ISSUES ON WHICH IT DID NOT PREVAIL 
Ironwood contended in its opening Appellants' Brief that 
Graco is not entitled to the $3,798.75 attorney fee awarded by 
the District Court because it failed to distinguish in its proof 
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of fees as to those which were incurred in the successful 
prosecution of its mechanics1 lien claim and those which were 
incurred in the unsuccessful prosecution of its contractors1 bond 
and unjust enrichment or implied contract claims. Appellants1 
Brief, pp. 11-15. Graco disputes that contention, attempts to 
distinguish the cases supporting Ironwood's position, and asserts 
without citation of any authority whatsoever that the prevailing 
party under the lien statute should be awarded all of its 
reasonable attorney's fees regardless of other theories it may 
have pled. Respondents' Brief, p. 13. 
Graco attempts to distinguish the cases cited by Ironwood in 
its opening Appellants' Brief on the ground that they involved 
situations in which a portion of the attorney's fees were 
incurred in the successful prosecution of a claim for which 
attorney's fees were allowable and the balance of the fees were 
incurred in the defense of counterclaims for which attorney fees 
would not be allowed. Although that observation is correct, 
Graco misses the message that this Court conveyed in deciding 
those cases. In Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah, 1978), the 
Court said: "[L]iability for payment of attorney's fees extends 
only to the amount necessary for the enforcement of the 
contract." !Id., p. 604. In the context of the instant action, 
that rule requires that the award of attorney's fees be limited 
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to the amount necessary for the enforcement of the lien. The 
rule does not allow the award of attorney's fees under the lien 
statute for prosecution of other theories, i.e., unjust 
enrichment and contractors' bond claims. And in Utah Farm 
Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah, 1981), 
it was said: "A party is . . . entitled only to those fees 
resulting from its principle cause of action for which there is a 
contractual (or statutory) obligation for attorney's fees." 
Here, the only statutory obligation is with respect to the lien 
statute and there is no contractual obligation for attorney's 
fees in Graco's other theories of recovery. 
Graco asserts that it is entitled to an award of all of its 
attorney's fees under the mechanics' lien statute, even though 
some of those fees were incurred in the unsuccessful prosecution 
of its contractors' bond claims (for which fees would be 
awardable to Graco only if it prevailed) and for the unsuccessful 
prosecution of its unjust enrichment or implied contract claims 
(for which no fees would be awardable regardless of Graco's 
success). If this approach were adopted, it would be tantamount 
to saying that an attorney's fee provision from one statute or 
contract can be applied in awarding fees under another. For 
instance, if Graco had prevailed on its unjust enrichment claim 
but lost on its mechanics' lien claim, could the Court award 
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attorney's fees to Graco under the attorney fee provisions of the 
mechanics' lien statute simply because it alleged a mechanics' 
lien claim? No. Clearly, Graco would not be entitled to its 
fees if it did not prevail under the mechanics' lien statute. 
That being the case, why then should it recover fees for the 
prosecution of similarly unrelated claims on which it did not 
prevail and for which it would not be entitled to attorney's 
fees? 
Graco suggests that the requirement that counsel segregate 
the fees as to the various theories being prosecuted would be 
unworkable. This Court has already required counsel to keep 
track of the time expended in prosecution of a complaint as 
opposed to time expended in defense of a counterclaim. That is 
workable. It would work just as well in keeping track of 
different theories. In filing an attorney fee claim, counsel 
need only to sit down and in good faith ask himself or herself 
whether the work done during any particular time segment related 
in any way to work for which attorney's fees are awardable. If 
so, the fees would be claimed; if not, they would not. 
III. UTAH'S CONTRACTORS' BOND STATUTE DOES 
NOT APPLY TO EQUIPMENT RENTALS 
By way of cross-appeal, Graco contends that the District 
Court erred in denying its contractors' bond claims. In support 
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of its contention, Graco simply asserts that this Court should 
rewrite the contractors1 bond statute to add a provision 
requiring such a bond if the contract includes rental expenses 
for equipment. We agree that the Court has on occasion referred 
to the mechanics' lien statute to construe the contractors1 bond 
statute as asserted by Graco. Respondents' Brief, p. 15. The 
Court is limited in such referral, however, to its effort to 
determine the legislative intent -- it cannot write into the 
contractors' bond statute something that the Legislature has 
omitted, i.e., rental provisions. 
The contractors' bond statute reads in pertinent part as 
follows:2 
The owner of any interest in land entering 
into a contract . . . for the construction, 
addition to, or alteration or repair of, any 
building, structure or improvement upon land 
shall . . . obtain from the contractor a bond 
in a sum equal to the contract price . . . 
conditioned for the faithful performance of 
the contract and prompt payment for material 
furnished and labor performed under the 
contract. . . . [A]ny person who has 
furnished materials or performed labor for or 
upon any such building, structure or 
improvement, payment for which has not been 
made, shall have a direct right of action 
against the sureties upon such bond for the 
2At pages 13 and 14 of its Brief of Respondents, Graco has 
quoted the contractors' bond statute in full. However, the 
quotation is of the statute as it was amended in 1985, not as it 
existed in December, 1983 and January, 1984, the pertinent period 
for our purposes. As will be seen, this is a very important oversight. 
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reasonable value of the materials furnished 
or labor performed . . . . 
Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended 1977); 
Addendum No. 2. This statute differs in at least two material 
respects from the mechanics' lien statute as it existed at the 
time Graco performed its rental contract. First, this statute 
had not been amended to include the rental of equipment as 
occurred with the mechanics1 lien statute of 1981. Second, there 
was no reference whatsoever to the development of oil wells as is 
provided in the mechanics' lien statute. Thus, referral to the 
mechanics1 lien statute as an aid to interpretation of the 
contractors' bond statute is of no avail. Because there is no 
mention of either the fact that the bond statute is intended to 
apply to rentals or to oil and gas development, we must conclude 
that it does not so apply. 
That conclusion is confirmed by the subsequent act of the 
Legislature in 1985. As indicated previously in footnote 2, the 
Legislature amended the statute in 1985 in several particulars, 
including the addition of the words "equipment and materials 
rented" near the end of the current first sentence, the words "or 
rented any equipment or" near the first portion of what is now 
the third sentence, and the words "for the reasonable value of 
the rented materials or equipment furnished" near the end of what 
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is now the third sentence3 . See § 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 
(as amended, 1985); Addendum No- 3. The Legislature has thus 
demonstrated that in its collective judgment the statute (as it 
provided at the time Graco rented the equipment to Lantz) did not 
contemplate that rentals would require a bond. Since it did not 
so provide, the District Court properly dismissed GracoTs claim 
for judgment thereon. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED GRACO ITS 
RECOVERY ON THE THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Also in its cross-appeal, Graco has asserted that Ironwood 
has been unjustly enriched in the amount of $10,035.00, the 
amount it did not pay its general contractor, Lantz Drilling & 
Exploration Company, Inc., under the contract between them; to 
remedy that alleged inequity, Graco asks this Court to imply a 
contract between Graco and Ironwood.4 Respondents1 Brief, 
pp. 16-17. Gracofs unjust enrichment theory is, however, barred 
3
 The statute was further amended in 1987 but, since the 
pertinent period for purposes of this action is December, 1983 
and January, 1984, that amendment is of no import. 
4Graco argues that Ironwood must pay someone the amount that 
it did not pay Lantz. However, should this Court disagree with 
Ironwood*s contentions on this appeal (i.e., that judgment was 
improperly entered against it on the mechanics' lien claims), 
then Ironwood will have paid, or be liable for payment of, more 
than the amount it retained from its contract with Lantz and, 
therefore, it could not be unjustly enriched in that amount. 
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as a matter of law and, therefore, the District Court's denial 
thereof must be sustained. 
In Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 
P. 2d 773 (Utah, 1977), the defendant Adams was the owner of a 
building which he leased to Great Outdoors Inc. which, in turn, 
contracted with the plaintiff for the purchase of materials used 
in modifying the building. When Great Outdoors Inc. did not pay 
for the goods, the plaintiff filed suit against Adams, alleging 
an implied contract between it and Adams on the claim that he had 
been unjustly enriched. This Court refused to allow the unjust 
enrichment claim for a number of reasons, one of which was that 
there can be no implied agreement where there exists an express 
agreement: 
It is also noted that there was an express 
contract between plaintiff and the lessee for 
the furnishing of materials, and when an 
express agreement exists one may not be 
implied. 
Id., 564 P.2d 774 (citations omitted). The same situation exists 
here. Graco had an express contract with Lantz Drilling & 
Exploration Company, Inc. for the rental of the equipment for 
which Graco now seeks judgment from Ironwood. Agreed Statement 
of the Record on Appeal, Par. 3. The existence of that express 
rental subcontract bars Gracofs unjust enrichment claim against 
Ironwood as a matter of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in Point I above, this Court 
should reverse the lower court and enter judgment in favor of 
Ironwood and against Graco, no cause of action, on Graco's 
mechanics' lien claims. The lower court's award of attorney fees 
to Graco should also be reversed in view of Graco's failure to 
establish that the fees it claims were incurred in prosecution of 
claims on which it prevailed. 
With respect to Graco's cross-appeal, the lower court's 
denial of recovery on both Graco's contractors' bond claim and 
its unjust enrichment claim should be affirmed. 
DATED this <^^> day of September, 1987. 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER 
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ADDENDUM "1 
38-10-102. Those entitled to lien — What may be attached 
— Qualifying work, materials, equipment, and 
costs — Liability of nonoperating owners. 
(1) Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing work upon, or 
furnishing materials or equipment for any production unit, under contract 
with the owner, or the owner's agent or contractor shall have a lien upon the 
interest of the owner in: 
(a) the production unit and access rights appurtenant thereto; 
(b) pipelines, including rights of way, buildings, wells, oil tanks, and 
appurtenances located on the land or leasehold within the production 
unit; and 
(c) the ore, minerals, oil, gas, or associated substances in the ground, or 
while the same remain in storage on the production unit, which are at-
tributable to the interest subject to the lien as the interest existed on the 
date work was first performed or materials or equipment were first fur-
nished. 
(2) The lien upon the interest of the owner in property described in Subsec-
tions (l)(a) through (c) shall be for the value of the work performed or mate-
rials or equipment furnished for: 
(a) open pit work, field processing, construction, alteration, digging, 
drilling, driving, boring, operating, perforating, fracturing, testing, log-
ging, acidizing, cementing, completion, repair, maintenance, prospecting, 
sampling, exploration, development, preservation, performing geophysi-
cal, geochemical, location, or assessment work, or related activities; 
(b) work performed or materials or equipment furnished in accordance 
with a pooling order, or pursuant to an operating agreement, or other 
agreement governing joint mining, or oil, and gas operations; 
(c) title services, designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, 
estimates of cost, surveys, permitting, or regulatory compliance; 
(d) foreclosure costs including publication, costs of sale, sheriffs fees, 
attorney's fees, and other costs of collection; and 
(e) transportation and related mileage charges, for any work performed 
or materials or equipment furnished pursuant to Subsections (2)(a) 
through (d). 
(3) For purposes of this section, the operator under a joint operating agree-
ment, unit operating agreement, or other agreement granting one owner con-
trol of operations on the production unit shall not be considered to be the 
agent or contractor of the nonconsenting, nonoperating owners. The operator 
shall, however, have the lien granted under Subsection (1) upon the interest of 
all nonoperating owners for work performed, or materials or equipment fur-
nished by the operator; and the nonoperating owners shall have the lien 
granted under Subsection (1) upon the interest of the operator for work per-
formed, or materials or equipment furnished by third persons to the extent the 
nonoperating owners have paid or advanced funds to the operator for such 
work, materials, or equipment. 
History: C. 1953, 38-10-102, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 170, S 6. 
ADDENDUM "2 
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.—The owner of any 
interest in land entering into a contract, involving $500 or more, for 
the construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of, any building, struc-
ture or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, 
obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract price, 
with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful performance 
of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished and labor 
performed under the contract. Such bond shall run to the owner and to 
all other persons as their interest may appear; and any person who has 
furnished materials or performed labor for or upon any such building, 
structure or improvement, payment for which has not been made, shall 
have a direct right of action against the sureties upon such bond for the 
reasonable value of the materials furnished or labor performed, not ex-
ceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed upon; which right of 
action shall accrue forty days after the completion, or abandonment, or 
default in the performance, of the work provided for in the contract. 
The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to any person inter-
ested, upon request. 
History: L. 1015, ch. 01, §§1-3; C. L. 
1917, §§3759-3761; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
17-2-1. 
NOTE: A printed version of the statute as arrended in 1977 
is not available. The language in 1977 (and until 
1985) was identical to the above except that the 
triggering contract amount was changed from $500 
to $2,000 in 1977. 
ADDENDUM "3 
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. 
The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000 
or more, for the construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any building, 
structure, or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is com-
menced, obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract 
price, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful perfor-
mance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished, equipment 
and materials rented, and labor performed under the contract. This bond runs 
to the owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear. Any person 
who has furnished or rented any equipment or materials, or performed labor 
for or upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for which payment 
has not been made, has a direct right of action against the sureties upon such 
bond for the reasonable value of the rented materials or equipment furnished, 
for the reasonable value of the materials furnished, or for labor performed, not 
exceeding the prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after 
the completion, abandonment, or default in the performance of the work pro-
vided for in the contract. 
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request. 
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §§ 1 to 3; C.L. 
1917, §§ 3759 to 3761; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
17-2-1; L. 1977, ch. 56, § 3; 1985, ch. 219, § 1. 
